Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation: The Case of the Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks by Poudineh, R. & Zhang, Y.
 UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge Working 
Papers in Economics 
 
Investment and Efficiency under Incentive 
Regulation:  
The Case of the Norwegian Electricity 
Distribution Networks  
 
 Rahmatallah Poudineh 
 
Tooraj Jamasb 
 
CWPE 1310 
 Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation:  
The Case of the Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks 
 
Rahmatallah Poudineh 
Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University, UK 
 
Tooraj Jamasb
1
 
Durham University Business School, Durham, UK 
 
April 2013 
 
Abstract 
Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many 
sector regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the 
networks through incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and productivity 
analysis. This approach has often resulted in cost efficiency and quality of service 
improvement. However, there remains a growing concern as to whether the utilities 
invest sufficiently and efficiently in maintaining and modernising the networks to 
ensure long term reliability and also to meet future challenges of the grid. This paper 
analyses the relationship between investments and cost efficiency in the context of 
incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investments using a panel 
dataset of 126 Norwegian distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. We introduce 
the concept of “no impact efficiency” as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of 
investment under incentive regulation which makes a firm “investment efficient” in 
cost benchmarking practice. Also, we estimate the observed efficiency effect of 
investments in order to compare with no impact efficiency and discuss the 
implication of cost benchmarking for investment behaviour of network companies. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, achieving a sustainable energy sector, security of supply, and reliability of 
service have emerged as overarching energy policy objectives in many countries. A 
sustainable energy economy is highly dependent on decarbonising the electricity sector. 
Meanwhile, further electrification of the economy is generally regarded as desirable for a 
sustainable energy-economy. These goals are pursued through large scale deployment of 
renewable energy sources, more efficient use of energy, and active participation of the 
demand side.  
Achieving the above goals requires a transformation of the electricity networks through 
expansion of grids, adoption of new technologies for managing the variability of the supply 
side, accommodating an active demand side, and focused research and development. Such 
transformation can only be reached through substantial capital investments. Given the 
anticipated scale of the required investments in the coming years, ensuring sufficient and 
efficient investments in the networks presents itself as a policy and regulatory priority.  
Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many sector 
regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the networks 
through incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and productivity analysis. Although, 
benchmarking has achieved efficiency (mainly in operating costs) new challenges have 
emerged as how to address the issue of network investments. The problem is whether a 
system of regulation can be designed that provides right incentives for delivery of cost 
effective services while ensuring there is no systematic underinvestment or overinvestment. 
Hence, regulators need to balance the cost and risk of underinvestment against the cost of 
overinvestment in maintaining and modernising the networks. The incentive regulation 
accentuates static cost efficiency while investment is a dynamic and long term activity. On 
the other hand, benchmarking is a relative concept in the sense that firm’s efficiency depends 
not only on its own performance but also on the performance of other companies. The 
paradoxical effect of incentive regulation concerning investment and the peculiar 
specifications of benchmarking total costs complicate the relationship between investment 
and cost efficiency under the incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of 
investment cost.   
This paper analyses the relationship between cost efficiency and investments under incentive 
regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditure using the case of Norway. 
The contribution of this paper is two-folded. Firstly, we introduce the concept of “no impact 
efficiency” as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under incentive regulation 
which makes the firm “investment efficient” and immune from cost disallowance in 
benchmarking process. Secondly, we estimate the “observed” efficiency effect of investment 
in order to compare with no impact efficiency and hence; discuss the implication of cost 
benchmarking for the investment behaviour of distribution companies in Norway. Despite the 
important role of regulatory treatment of capital expenditure, using benchmarking total costs, 
for investments behaviour and efficiency improvement in the networks, the topic has not been 
formally studied in the empirical literature.   
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The next Section discusses the relationship between network investments and incentive 
regulation with reference to the Norwegian regulation regime. Section 3 describes the 
methodology used to conceptualise the efficiency implications of investment under incentive 
regulation and also presents the stochastic frontier analysis procedure. The empirical results 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is the conclusions. 
 
2 Investment and regulation 
Electricity networks are regulated natural monopolies and investments by network companies 
are not governed by market mechanisms where decisions are normally based upon expected 
higher returns than the incurred cost of capital. In a regulated environment such as the 
electricity networks, the investment behaviour of firms is strongly influenced by the 
regulatory framework and institutional constraints (Vogelsang, 2002; Crew and Kleindorfer, 
1996). The low-powered regulatory regimes such as pure “rate of return regulation” are often 
associated with poor incentive for efficiency. Averch-Johnson (1962) showed that regulated 
monopolies have an incentive to overinvest when the allowed rate of return is higher than the 
cost of capital.  
The Incentive-based regimes such as price or revenue caps aim to overcome the efficiency 
problem by decoupling prices from utilities’ own costs. However, they give rise to new 
challenges regarding the level of investments. The issue of cost efficiency at the expense of 
investments or service quality has been discussed in the literature (see e.g., Giannakis et al., 
2005; Rovizzi and Thompson, 1995; Markou and Waddams Price, 1999). Also, when rewards 
and penalties are weak or uncertain, the incentive for cost reductions outweighs the 
inducement to maintain quality of service and investment. Furthermore, implementing 
incentive regulation is complicated and evaluation of the associated efficiency is more 
difficult than it is often implied (Joskow, 2008). 
The empirical evidence concerning investment behaviour of companies under incentive 
regime is not conclusive. While some initially argued that incentive regulation leads to 
underinvestment, the later empirical works demonstrated that the outcome of the incentive 
regulation concerning the investment behaviour can be in either direction. Waddam Price et 
al. (2002), state that a high-powered incentive regulation might lead to overinvestment. 
Roques and Savva (2009) argue that a relatively high price cap can encourage investment in 
cost reduction as in an unregulated company. Nagel and Rammerstorfer (2008) showed that a 
strict incentive regulation regime is more likely to create disincentive for investments. 
However, it is generally agreed that in incentive regimes, due to separation of firms’ own cost 
from prices, the motivation for cost reducing investment is higher than under the rate of 
return regulation (Ai and Sappington, 2002; Greenstein et al., 1995).  
Thus, the main challenge of the regulator is to choose the right incentives in order to prevent 
any systematic overcapitalisation or underinvestment. The ability to disallow excessive costs 
can help regulators achieve more efficient levels of investment which otherwise firms would 
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tend to overinvest in risky projects (Lyon and Mayo, 2005). However, following periods of 
cost disallowances there is a greater possibility of disincentive for investments.  
The regulatory opportunistic behaviour is also a concern for the regulated firm as it 
introduces uncertainty into the regulatory contract. Gal-Or and Spiro (1992), for example, 
argue that a sudden shift in regulatory regime which allows for the use of cost disallowance 
instruments will decrease the propensity to invest. Regulatory uncertainty is an important 
issue in network industries such as electricity networks and can have serious implications for 
investments. This is because under uncertainty, delaying investments may be beneficial even 
though a project may indeed recover its capital costs (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). There is also 
non-regulatory uncertainty, such as future demand, that the regulated company needs to take 
into consideration when deciding to invest.  
From the regulatory viewpoint, it is important that decisions influencing the investments of 
the firms are based upon economic efficiency. For example, the cost of reducing service 
interruptions through investments should be lower than the socio-economic costs of service 
interruption. In effect, the regulator seeks an efficient level of investment in the grid although 
realising this goal through regulation is a challenging task. This is because theory does not 
provide clear indications of the conditions under which “efficient” levels of investment are 
achieved and what factors lead to over and underinvestment (von Hirschhausen, 2008). 
Moreover, the empirical evidence from cases of overinvestment or underinvestment is rare. 
Therefore, the outcome of incentive regulation regarding investments is ambiguous, and that 
regulators in practice tend to adopt a combination of different regulatory incentive 
mechanisms in order to achieve their objectives. 
 
2.1 Power sector reform and network regulation in Norway 
Norway was among the first countries, after Chile and the UK, to embark on power sector 
reform by unbundling the different elements of electricity industry across the value chain. 
This means generation and retail supply which are potentially competitive were separated 
from the transmission and distribution that are natural monopolies. Hence; the distribution 
and transmission networks are subject to regulation. The Norwegian Water Resource and 
Energy Directorate (NVE) were appointed as the sector regulator since Norwegian Energy 
Act came into effect in 1991. Unlike the other countries where regulatory reform was often 
accompanied by transfer of ownership, the Norwegian power industry mainly remained under 
the state or local municipalities’ control after reform. Also, companies that involve in both 
monopolistic (distribution or regional transmission) and competitive business (generation or 
retail supply) are required to keep them separated either legally and/or financially
2
.  
                                                          
2
 In 2010, about 67 companies were involved in generation, grid operation, and supply to end users. Vertically 
integrated companies with more than 100,000 customers are obliged to separate their monopolistic operation 
from competitive activities (legal unbundling). The Energy Act requires the integrated companies to keep 
separate accounts for their monopolistic and competitive businesses (NVE, 2010). 
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At the early years of the reform, there were approximately 230 distribution networks and 70 
generation units in Norway. The high number of utilities reflects the dispersed nature of 
hydroelectric resources as the main source of power generation as well as the historical 
development of the sector in the country. In December 2010, around 167 companies were 
engaged in gird operation (NVE, 2010). The marked reduction in the number of distribution 
companies is the result of mergers and acquisitions among network companies in pursuit of 
scale efficiency gains.  
After the reform, initially the distribution companies were operating under the rate of return 
regulation. However, due to lack of incentives for cost efficiency, since 1997, the regulatory 
regime was changed to incentive regulation. From 2007, NVE implemented a new regulatory 
model which also uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an efficiency benchmarking 
method. The companies are regulated with a revenue cap regime that covers their costs 
annually based on their distance from the efficient frontier (best practice) in the sector. 
 
2.2 Investments under Norwegian regulatory regime 
A feature of the Norwegian incentive regulation is to prevent systematic overinvestment or 
underinvestment in the networks. The incentives are provided through a combination of 
economic and direct regulation (NordREG, 2011). Along with the profit motivation, the 
network companies need to undertake substantial investments in order to meet their 
obligations as stated in the Energy Act. For example, Section 3-4 of amended Energy Act 
states that distribution companies are obliged to connect new generation sources and 
consumers that are not covered by the supply requirement.  
Moreover, distribution companies are incentivised to maintain a high level of quality of 
service. The cost of network energy losses and cost of energy not supplied (CENS) due to 
interruptions or capacity constraints in the grid are incorporated in the regulatory model so 
that the firms take them into account. Therefore, firms normally should not have an incentive 
to tune out their reinvestments as this would increases their total costs due to deterioration of 
their quality of service over time. In addition, a profit incentive is provided through a 
minimum guaranteed return on capital. The regulation states that all companies should 
achieve a reasonable (minimum 2%) return on capital, given effective management, 
utilization, and development of the networks
3
. Similarly, overinvestment will increase the 
total costs and will negatively affect their relative efficiency in the cost benchmarking 
exercise which will impact their revenue adversely. 
Figure 1 shows total investments, new investments, and reinvestments by the distribution 
companies between 2004 and 2010. As shown, total investments are strictly increasing since 
2006. The investment data indicates that the source of investment increase is reinvestment 
and not the new investments. Although new investments remained almost constant, they have 
                                                          
3
 Any network company that falls below this minimum level will receive a correction in its revenue so that they 
achieve a minimum 2% return on capital. The normal return for Norwegian distribution companies is currently 
5.62%. 
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had a higher share in total investments than reinvestments. For instance, 68% of the 
investments observations during the period of study have a share of new investments to total 
investments that is higher than 50%. This can be an indication of strong investment 
incentives which have motivated the networks to undertake new investments, possibly 
beyond their minimum reinvestment needs. Such a change can be attributed to the regulator’s 
view in recent years that social costs of underinvestment are higher than social benefits of 
overinvestment (Helm and Thompson, 1991). 
 
 
Figure 1: Investments in Norwegian distribution companies 
 
3 Methodology 
In this Section, we first present a model of the incentive regulation of electricity distribution 
networks in Norway and then analyse the relationship between investments by the utilities 
and change in their relative efficiency under incentive scheme. We then describe the 
econometric approach and the models estimated in order to explore the efficiency effects of 
investments. 
 
3.1 Modelling Incentive Regulation  
The allowed revenues of regulated networks are determined by incentive regulation and cost 
efficiency benchmarking. Within this framework, investments are encumbered indirectly 
such that overinvestment can result in partial disallowance of investment costs. The 
Norwegian regulator computes the allowed revenue (   ) of the firms using Equation (1), 
which, in essence, is the generic incentive regulation formula representing the trade-off 
between cost reduction incentive and rent transfer to the consumer, given the presence of 
asymmetric information between the firm and the regulator (Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 2005).  
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                      (1) 
Where    is the actual (own) costs of a network company,   
  is the norm cost obtained by 
using the frontier-based benchmarking method Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and   is 
the power of incentive in terms of the weight given to benchmarked costs vs. actual costs in 
setting the allowed revenue. The power of incentive is important for motivating the firms to 
move as close as possible to their norm (benchmarked) cost as they lose revenue when 
deviating from the efficient frontier. The share of actual costs and norm costs in determining 
the revenue caps is currently 40 and 60% respectively (i.e.      ). Placing more weight on 
norm costs increases the incentive power of regulation and promotes indirect competition 
among the utilities to improve their cost efficiency relative to best practice. 
Actual costs include operating and maintenance costs, capital costs, and depreciation costs. In 
addition, the regulator deducts the cost of energy not supplied (CENS) from the firms’ 
revenue cap
4
 and adjusts the allowed revenue for tax and other non-controllable expenses. 
The regulator uses data with a two year lag which is updated with an inflation index. The 
allowed revenue is then corrected at the end of the year when final actual data becomes 
available
5
. 
We divide both sides of (1) with    and rearrange such that it yields: 
                                                                               (2) 
where    
  
 
  
 is the firms’ efficiency in period  . When a firm invests the amount   , this 
will impact its revenue by changing its relative efficiency in cost benchmarking. The 
variables for before and after undertaking investments are denoted by subscripts 1 and 2 
respectively. The change in a firm’s revenue due to an investment can be computed from 
equation (3).  
                                                                             (3) 
The change in actual cost of the firms after undertaking investments is equal to the amount of 
investments (           ). We substitute for    in the bracket and rearrange (3) as 
presented in (4) to show the change in revenue as a result of investments. 
                                                                               (4) 
                                                        
                                            Revenue effect of investments due to benchmarking 
                                                          
4
 In order to incentivise network companies to improve service quality. 
5
 While the current and previous year investments (years t and t-1) are not included in the regulatory asset base 
(RAB) due to a time-lag, the companies can start to calculate a return on investment into their allowed revenue 
(i.e. tariff base) from the commissioning year.  
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Equation (4) presents the main framework for the network companies’ incentive to undertake 
investments. In the absence of cost benchmarking (i.e. when    ) the firm would 
automatically earn a return on its investments because the change in the firm’s revenue is the 
same as the change in its cost (      ), and the company can pass all its investment costs 
to its customers. However, as investments are included in cost benchmarking, the firms’ 
revenue also depends on their relative cost efficiency before investments (  ) and after 
investments (  ). This is reflected in the second component of (4), to which we refer as   in 
(5), and shows the (gross) revenue effect of investments due to benchmarking. 
                                                                                        (5) 
As seen from (5), the revenue effect of investments consists of two parts. Clearly, we always 
have         . However, the outcome of the component         of (5) is not certain as 
it is not clear whether, following an investment, the cost efficiency increases, decreases, or 
remains constant
6
.  
Depending on the initial and after investment measured cost efficiency,   can take different 
values. If   , the firm gains less from investing compared to the case of no cost 
benchmarking (ceteris paribus). However, when    , investment costs are fully recovered 
as there is no benchmarking. If    , investment creates synergy by excessive increase in 
efficiency although this may not happen under normal condition
7
 so in most situations one 
expects    .  
                                                                                                             (6) 
Thus, as shown in (6), the change in revenue after investments is not necessarily equal to the 
change in cost and it crucially depends on the value that   takes. Although the revenue also 
depends on the power of incentive ( ), it is a predetermined parameter which is beyond the 
control of the firm. Thus, the feasible outcome can only be achieved when     and 
benchmarking has no adverse impact on the firms’ revenue. - i.e. when the efficiency after 
investments increases (due to productivity of capital) to an amount that results in     (note 
that also when the firm is on the efficient frontier and remains there after investments we 
have          and consequently   becomes zero). This efficiency can be obtained by 
solving (5) with respect to    as in (7). 
                                                                 
       
     
                                   (7)  
Equation (7) shows how the Norwegian incentive regulation links investments to efficiency 
improvement. In order for a firm to earn a profit on its investments as if there was no cost 
benchmarking (ceteris paribus), its efficiency should be, at least, 
       
     
 after the investment. 
                                                          
6
                                  . 
7
 The reason is that if the share of investments to other costs (before investments) increases, the efficiency 
required to satisfy the inequality rises considerably. However, under certain circumstance we can have     
which we refer to it in Section 4. 
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An efficiency level below this will result in lower revenue relative to the no benchmarking 
case. We use the term ‘no impact efficiency’ to refer to the ‘revenue-neutral efficiency effect 
of investment under cost benchmarking as presented in (7). In other words, a firm is 
considered ‘investment efficient’ when it meets the ‘no impact efficiency’ criteria under 
regulation
8
. 
The Norwegian incentive regulation links investment and efficiency to ensure that firms do 
not undertake undue investments. This means that the regulator does not need to interfere in 
the firms’ investment decisions, but indirectly incentivises them to be investment efficient. A 
limit analysis of (7) shows that as    increases, the efficiency    will approach   . The 
opposite of this implies that when the ratio of investment to other cost
9
 increases, the firm 
needs to achieve a higher efficiency level (which in limits is equal to unity) in order to avoid 
revenue loss. This means that the expected interval of the no impact efficiency change is 
               , which depending upon the investment to cost ratio would be closer to 
lower or upper boundary.  
Figure 2 shows the possible outcomes of efficiency effect of investment in the Norwegian 
regulation as an ex-post regulatory model for treatment of investments. When a firm (with an 
initial cost and efficiency level) undertakes an investment, it achieves a new level of 
efficiency (A). On the other hand, regulation links the initial cost, efficiency, and investment 
to no impact efficiency and rewards or penalises the firm based on the efficiency effect of 
their investments (B). In practice, this reflects the incentive mechanism pertaining to 
investments. 
 
Figure 2: Possible efficiency effects of investment under Norwegian incentive regulation 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 For simplicity, we assume that the frontier firms are genuinely efficient though, in practice, this may not be the 
case.  
9
 The ratio of ‘investment to other costs before investments’, the average of this ratio for the Norwegian 
networks is currently 34%. The maximum is 168% and the minimum is 1.3%. 
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3.2 Modelling a Stochastic Efficient Frontier 
This section presents the efficiency measurement techniques and empirical model estimated 
in this study. We estimate the efficiency of firms before and after investments and use the 
efficiencies to calculate the ‘no impact efficiency’ for current investment levels of the 
networks. We use an input distance function which allows us to estimate the efficiency of the 
firms when input price data is not available (Färe and Lovell, 1978; Coelli, 1995). Other 
advantages of distance functions are that they do not depend on explicit behavioural 
assumptions such as cost minimization or profit maximization and they can accommodate 
multiple inputs and outputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000; Coelli et al., 2005).  
Input distance functions have been used in empirical studies for efficiency and productivity 
analysis of industrial units as in Abrate and Erbetta (2010) and Das and Kumbhakar (2012) as 
well as those of electricity networks such as Tovar et al. (2011), Hess and Cullmann (2007), 
and Growitsch et al. (2012). The output of electricity networks is determined exogenously by 
demand for energy and connection thus companies can only adjust inputs (i.e. costs) to 
deliver a given service efficiently.  
An input distance function can be defined as in (8): 
                                            {  (
 
 
)      }                                       (8) 
where      represents the input vectors   that produce the output vector  , and   indicates a 
proportional reduction in input vector. The function has the following characteristics: (i) it is 
linearly homogenous in  , (ii) it is non-decreasing in   and non-increasing in  , (iii) it is 
concave in   and quasi-concave in  , and (iv) if        then      and      if   is on 
the frontier of input set. 
Input-oriented technical efficiency can be obtained from (9):  
                                                         ,                                     (9) 
This means that technical efficiency is defined as the inverse of the distance function. When a 
firm is operating on the frontier it shows a distance function value equal to unity and 
consequently has a technical efficiency score of 1. The general form of an input distance 
function is as in (10): 
     
     ∑   
 
   
       
 
 
∑ ∑    
 
   
 
   
             
 ∑   
 
   
        
 
 
∑ ∑   
 
   
 
   
             
 ∑ ∑    
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where    
  represents the distance function,      is output,      is input,   represents time 
trend, subscript i=1…N denotes the number of the firms, and t=1…T indicates number of 
years. Also,      and       show the number of outputs and inputs respectively. 
Parameters  ,  ,    and   are to be estimated.  
Condition of homogeneity of degree one in input is imposed by the following constraints: 
∑   
 
   
            ∑   
 
   
                      
          and 
∑    
 
   
                                            
Symmetry condition is met if: 
                                                                                      (11) 
We transform the input distance function into econometric models to be estimated by the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method and to obtain technical efficiency of the firms. 
Imposing the homogeneity of degree one by deflating     inputs by  th input (we use 
other cost (  ) to deflate) will lead to (12): 
                                
                                                          (12) 
where      is the translog functional form. For the purpose of estimation we rearrange the 
above equation as: 
                                                                                     (13) 
where      
      represents the non-negative technical inefficiency. The error components 
have the following distributions. 
                                           
            and                 
      
                 (14) 
    is a normally distributed random error term and     is a half-normal heteroscedastic 
random error term that capture inefficiency. As the efficiency is affected by the investments 
we model the heteroscedastic inefficiency variance (  
      as in (15).  
                                          
                       
              (15) 
                                       
                           
        
where    and    are parameters that needs to be estimated and      is normalised investment 
level with respect to sample median. As shown in (16) we can separate the heteroscedastic 
variance into its homoscedastic component (  
    ) and the element related to investments.  
EPRG 1306
11 
 
  
               (               
     )   
  
                        
         (16) 
This allows us to purge the effect of investments on inefficiency as seen from (17). In terms 
of estimation, equations (13) and (15) are estimated simultaneously based on the only 
observed data in (13). Having estimated them, homoscedastic inefficiency can be easily 
obtained as follows: 
                                   
      
                        
         
                                    
      
                         
       
                                   ̂        ̂          ̂    
        ̂                                  (17) 
It is clear that  ̂        |     where            , On the other hand,  ̂    ̂      thus 
we can write:  
                                        ̂       
 ̂     
     ̂          ̂          
                                                (18)  
where,  ̂       is before-investment inefficiency and  ̂      is after-investment inefficiency 
( ̂  ). The firm specific technical efficiency is then computed by          ̂        and 
         ̂      . The “no impact efficiency” is calculated using Equation (7).  
 
3.3 Data 
We use a dataset comprising a weakly balanced panel of 126 distribution companies from 
2004 to 2010. All the monetary data are in real terms adjusted to 2010 price level. Our 
distance function model consists of two inputs and two outputs. The inputs are capital 
expenditure (  ) and other costs (   ). Following the Norwegian regulatory approach, we 
incorporate quality of service into our benchmarking model by adding the cost of negative 
externalities (network energy losses and service interruptions) to the directly incurred 
elements of operating cost as presented in (19).  
                                                                                    (19) 
The cost of energy not supplied is calculated from the number minutes of interruptions times 
consumer willingness-to-pay for more reliable service.
10
 The cost of network energy losses is 
computed by multiplying the physical losses with average annual system price of electricity 
as used by the regulator. 
                                                          
10
 Consumer willingness to pay for quality of service is derived from consumer surveys and technical analysis. 
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We use “total number of customers” (residential plus recreational homes) and “energy 
density” (energy distributed per Km length of network) as outputs. Numbers of customers are 
commonly used in efficiency analysis of electricity networks (e.g. Growitsch et al., 2012; 
Miguéis et al., 2011). Energy density captures the effect of asset utilisation and network 
congestion as cost drivers. Moreover, network reliability and consequently quality of supply 
is directly affected by the length of network (Coelli et al., 2010). In addition to the input and 
output variables we use three weather and geographical variables to capture the heterogeneity 
among the firms
11
. These factors can impact cost efficiency of the networks and controlling 
for their effects can help to account for unobserved heterogeneity among network utilities 
(Growitsch et al., 2011; Jamasb et al., 2012)
12
. Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics 
of the data used. 
As we use ‘other costs’ (  ) to impose homogeneity of degree one, the dependent variable of 
model is        . The parameters used in the model are obtained by maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure. The optimisation technique used is Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (bhhh) 
algorithm. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the first order terms, all 
variables are divided by their sample median prior to estimation.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Variable Name Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Inputs 
Other costs*     1205.25 1178987 40075.5 63466.03 
Capital expenditures*  In 167.11 92899.7 12730.71 16024.87 
Outputs  
Energy density (MWh/Km)     137.12 6485.25 554.64 515.670 
Number of customers (#)    18 515152 12575 25430.4 
Geographical variables  
Snow condition (millimetres)      53 1193.61 373.99 196.18 
Wind / distance to cost (ratio)      0 0.1610 0.0162 0.0288 
Forrest productivity (fraction)        0 0.5489 0.1566 0.1199 
*Monetary variables are in ‘000 NOK. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 The three variables are: (1) snow conditions, in millimeters of snow per year at a given temperature (around 0 
degrees C), (2) Wind and distance to coast, as a ratio (average extreme wind/distance to coast), and (3) forest 
productivity, a number between 0 and 1 showing the share of forest with this growth rate along the power lines. 
12
 We examined the influence of asset age (ratio of depreciation to book value) as control variable. However, the 
variable showed inconsistencies in the sign of the age variable itself as well as for first order terms of other 
variables. Other measures of age may produce different results but these were not available. At the same time, 
the results indicated that inclusion of age does not change the efficiency scores significantly. 
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4 Results and Discussion 
The profit motive implies that incentive regulated firms evaluate the cost and benefit of 
undertaking investments by comparing a possible reduction and increase in allowed revenue 
as a result of efficiency effect of the investments in cost benchmarking. However, the 
outcome depends on the net efficiency effect achieved by the investments.  
Table 2 presents the results of the input distance function and heteroscedastic variance model 
estimations. As shown, the coefficients of first order terms for the number of customers, 
energy density and investments are statistically significant and have the expected signs. 
These coefficients can be interpreted as distance function elasticity with respect to outputs 
and inputs at sample median. The first order coefficients for snow and wind are significant 
and consistent in terms of sign which indicate that these geographic variables are cost drivers 
as well. However, only one interaction term of wind and snow variables with the outputs is 
statistically significant. The heteroscedastic inefficiency variance model shows significant 
coefficients both for first order and quadratic terms. 
Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the efficiencies before and after investments. As shown, 
investments have impacted efficiency of the firms and within a relatively wide range. It is 
evident that the impact of investments on the efficiency variation among the firms is not 
uniform, in the sense that some of the firms gained while some others lost efficiency. This 
complies with the basic notion of ex-post regulatory treatment of investment based on 
benchmarking that efficiency effects influence investment behaviour of firms as high 
investments involve a risk of efficiency loss. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of efficiency variation following investments. The descriptive 
statistics of graph data is presented in Table 3. As seen from the graph and the table, the 
change in efficiency tends towards an asymmetrical distribution. The mean of efficiency 
variation presented in Table 3 implies that, on average, investment contributed to about 0.8% 
efficiency gain. However, the average might not be a very reliable measure for the 
performance of the whole sector, as it will be influenced by the outliers. Moreover, as shown 
in Table 3, the Jarque-Bera test of normality is rejected and distribution is right skewed. The 
maximum positive variation is 0.56 whereas on the negative side it is -0.34. In addition to 
implying that an increase in investments is associated with higher efficiency than with 
inefficiency, this can also be related to the notion that the fidelity of the estimations decrease 
as we begin to move away from the mean. The majority of the observations lie between -15% 
to 15% (one standard deviation) efficiency variations following investments. 
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Table2: Input distance function model estimation
13
 
Dependent variable:         
Variables                     Coefficient      Std. Err 
         
 
-3.997*** (1.288) 
        1.280*** (0.160) 
        -0.891*** (0.238) 
        -0.593** (0.257) 
            0.129*** (0.012) 
            0.169*** (0.040) 
            -0.037 (0.025) 
                
 
-0.133*** (0.011) 
                
 
0.052*** (0.015) 
                0.070*** (0.023) 
  -0.012 (0.012) 
      0.012*** (0.003) 
     
 
0.033** (0.014) 
     
 
0.005*** (0.001) 
       
 
-0.008 (0.009) 
             
 
0.040* (0.024) 
             -0.004 (0.036) 
             
 
0.000 (0.001) 
              
 
-0.004* (0.002) 
                
 
0.019 (0.015) 
                
 
0.037 (0.023) 
      
   
         
 
       -2.323***                    (0.831) 
         
 
      --0.467*                    (0.276) 
         
 
       --4.64***                    (0.750) 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Figure 3: Efficiency change in firms before and after investments 
                                                          
13
 For ease of interpretation, the model coefficients were multiplied by -1. 
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Figure 4: The distribution of efficiency change following investments 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of        
  
  
 Mean  0.007968 
 Median  0.001406 
 Maximum  0.571541 
 Minimum -0.348183 
 Std. Dev.  0.145273 
 Skewness  0.875255 
 Kurtosis  5.195926 
 Jarque-Bera  273.7230 
 Probability  0.000000 
  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated by the scatter plot in Figure 5, efficiency loss after investments is 
more prevalent among the companies with lower investment to total cost ratios. On the other 
hand, those companies with average investment levels show more efficiency gain following 
investments compared with companies with very high share of investment in total cost. This 
suggests that middle scale investments, typically, have been more productive than the larger 
and especially than the small ones. This can be an indication of complexity of investment and 
efficiency relation under benchmarking as lower capital expenditure might lead to an increase 
of other costs and hence; may not help with efficiency improvement. It also implies that small 
scale investments should be better scrutinized before implementation to avoid lower allowed 
revenue as a result of cost benchmarking. 
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Figure 5: Efficiency change versus investments to cost ratio 
 
Figure 6 summarises the distribution of before investment, after investment and no impact 
efficiency estimated in different years. As seen from the figure, in all cases the distributions 
do not show zero skewness rather the mass of distribution is concentrated around more 
efficient region without a noticeable change over different years. Additionally, the lower 
quartile is higher for the case of no impact efficiency compared with before investments and 
after investments efficiency, reflecting the fact that given the current level of investment 
efficiency improvement is required for many firms. 
Table 3 compares the average of the same efficiencies in each year for all companies. As the 
table shows, apart from 2006, on average, investment made positive contribution to 
efficiency of the sector. However, the average efficiency gained after investment fall behind 
no impact efficiency by 1% in 2010 to 4.3% in 2006. The average usually becomes affected 
by outliers hence; in order to make a more reliable inference on the performance of sector we 
have weighted efficiencies by the share of their corresponding investment in the total 
investment of the sector. This is to ensure that the weight effect of firms on the total 
investment behaviour of sector is taken into account when looking at the sector level. As it is 
shown in Table 3, the difference between before and after investment efficiencies raised to 
17%. At the same time, no impact efficiency reduced to reflect the fact that the sector still can 
increase the level of investment through new reallocations of investments and without 
lowering average efficiency gain of the sector.  
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Figure 6: Distribution of efficiencies estimated 
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Table 3: Average ‘before investment’, ‘after investment’, and ‘no impact’ efficiency 
Efficiency measured 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average of    0.896 0.897 0.902 0.892 0.894 0.892 0.883 
Average of    0.905 0.902 0.881 0.902 0.911 0.905 0.905 
Average of            0.921 0.923 0.924 0.918 0.923 0.921 0.915 
Weighted average                                                          
 
The reallocation of investments can increase total investments in the sector because there are 
significant performance discrepancies among the companies as depicted in Figures 3 and 4. 
The very efficient firms that surpassed no impact efficiency may wish to increase their 
investment levels in order to gain from their efficiency level. The investment increase can be 
continued until efficiency after investment reduces to no impact efficiency, in which state, 
some form of optimality will be achieved. On the other hand, those firms that their efficiency 
after investment falls short of no impact efficiency needs to reduce their investment level in 
order to avoid inefficiency associated loss
14
. The net effect of new reallocation is an increase 
in total investments without reducing the average efficiency of the sector. 
As discussed above, the outcome of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments through total 
cost benchmarking is that some firms will lose part of their capital cost while some other 
recover all their investment and some make above normal profit. For example, the few firms 
that appear to have outperformed the investment efficiency requirement – i.e. their efficiency 
after investments exceeded the no impact efficiency considerably (the instance of     
discussed in Section 3.1) can earn more compared to the no benchmarking case.  Under the 
circumstance that an “investment efficient frim” gains and an “investment inefficient” loses; 
the ex-post regulatory treatment of investment is effective in rewarding efficient and 
penalising inefficient firms.  
However, this might not always be the case as the condition under which benchmarking 
produce reliable results does not always hold. This is because efficiency, in benchmarking 
terms, is a relative concept and only reveals information about firm performance in relation to 
other firms. Thus, the relative efficiency of a firm can also improve when the peer companies 
are not performing well. For instance, when companies are capital productive and their 
investments are proportional to their capital productivity, they might move to a higher level 
of relative efficiency after investments. However, the same can happen when they 
underinvest, something which gives them the appearance of cost efficiency. Therefore, unless 
                                                          
14
 In this analysis we ignore the concept of dynamic efficiency hence; we do not take into account cost effect of 
investments that takes more than one regulatory period to become realised. This is because our positive analysis 
is based on the current form of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment practiced in 
Norway and many other countries. 
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the frontier firms genuinely represent the best practice, the results of benchmarking can be 
misleading.  
The benchmarking limitation regarding investment embraces other cases such as when the 
firms’ investments behaviour is harmonised in the sense that they are in the same phases of 
their investment cycles. This refers to the case that firms invest in the similar periods and in 
proportion to their total cost levels but beyond their capital productivity. As the measure of 
efficiency is relative the firms tend to remain in a relatively similar efficiency position before 
and after investment. Under this condition, benchmarking fails to identify the incidence of 
overinvestment.  
The regulator expects that the threat of partial disallowance of capital expenditures built into 
the regulatory formula leads the firms towards efficient investments. However; the power of 
the model to detect overinvestments is limited to the case of ‘out of phase’ investments (i.e. 
when firms are not in the same investment cycle). Thus, sector-wide ‘in phase’ or cyclically 
harmonised overinvestments by the firms are not revealed in the process of benchmarking 
because the approach is based on between-firms comparisons. This will, in turn, limit the 
ability of the regulator to effectively address the issue of overinvestment. Harmonised 
investment behaviour can happen when many firms follow a similar investment policy. For 
instance, when a regulator guides the investment into a desired direction by, for example, 
offering a higher return for investments in innovation and particular types of technologies and 
activities (e.g. Smart Grids). 
A parallel argument also holds in the case of harmonised underinvestment. This problem 
arises when the incentives to invest are not strong enough or the regulation is restrictive 
which causes firms to reduce their investments, something which in the short run can give the 
appearance of cost efficiency while, overtime, leading to gradual degradation of the networks 
and their reliability.  
There are some possible remedies to address the cases of harmonised underinvestment or 
overinvestment. For instance, the regulator can use the power of incentive ( ) in order to 
influence the investment inefficient firms when there is evidence of overcapitalisation. The 
higher power of incentive is the greater possibility of financial loss as a result of investment 
inefficiency. Thus, a high   causes investment inefficient firms to reduce their investments 
and consequently improve their efficiency. Also, frontier firms need to follow the same path 
to maintain their position on the frontier. At present,   is 60% for Norwegian distribution 
companies. A small increase in   can reduce the net efficiency gains by the firms and create 
disincentive for investments. On the contrary, reduction of the power of incentive aligns the 
revenue of the firm more with its actual cost and increases propensity to investment. 
However, the power of incentive is usually set for a long period of time in order to make the 
investment behaviour of firms predictable and provide a stable regulatory environment. 
Therefore, the regulator’s ability to modify the power of incentive is limited15.  
                                                          
15
 This strategy can have significant side effects such as inducing uncertainty in regulation. Therefore, it needs 
to be used with strong evidence of persistent or systematic over or underinvestment in the sector.  
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In order to avoid underinvestment and quality of supply deterioration induced by cost 
reduction incentives incorporated in incentive regulation, regulators adopt either quality 
performance targets or include the cost of network energy losses and cost of energy not 
supplied in benchmarking model as in the case of Norway. This is to ensure that no 
systematic underinvestment happens which endangers network reliability over time. 
However, the issue is that underinvestment can have an immediate effect on efficiency 
improvement whereas its impact on network reliability is lengthy.  
Another possible problem of ex-post regulatory treatment of investment using benchmarking 
is that it can ease the strategic behaviour for trade-off between Capex and Opex
16
 in order to 
avoid revenue loss from investment inefficiency when firms invest beyond their productive 
capacity. For instance, as shown in Table 2, investments and other costs are negatively 
correlated in a such way that a 1% increase in investment with respect to median of the sector 
can result in 0.59% reduction of other costs. This in turn raises the regulatory issue of 
substitution of capital for labour introduced by Averch-Johnson (1962). 
To sum up, the relationship between investment and efficiency under incentive regulation 
with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment is not straightforward. As efficiency is a 
relative concept in economics, performance of a firm is not only related to its own behaviour 
but also to that of other firms. The conditions under which overinvestment can reduce cost 
efficiency of the firm might not always hold. Moreover, it takes time for underinvestment to 
appear as cost in the form of quality of supply deterioration. The Norwegian regulator 
attempts to incentivise the companies to operate and maintain their networks in an efficient 
manner and provide a high level of reliability. However, the use of cost benchmarking in 
order to ensure effective capital expenditures does not necessarily lead to the socio-economic 
efficient level of investments. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Contrary to the early years of electricity sector reforms when regulators were mainly 
concerned with cost efficiency, an emerging and pressing issue is how to ensure sufficient 
and efficient level of investments in the regulated networks. Over the years, efficiency of the 
natural monopoly power networks has been improving as a result of incentive regulation. 
However, the need for significant investments in the future combined with the incentives to 
reduce costs gives rise to new challenges regarding the efficiency and sufficiency of 
investments in the networks. In this study we analysed the relation between cost efficiency 
and investment behaviour of electricity distribution networks under ex-post regulatory 
treatment of investments using the case of Norway. 
                                                          
16
 Capital expenditures and operational expenditures. 
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We introduced the concept of “no impact efficiency” as the revenue-neutral efficiency effect 
of investment under cost benchmarking which, if achieved, makes the firm “investment 
efficient” and immune from cost disallowance in benchmarking process. Also, we estimated 
the observed efficiency effect of investment in order to compare this with no impact 
efficiency and discussed the implication of cost benchmarking for the investment behaviour 
of distribution companies in Norway.  
The results show that the un-weighted average efficiency gain of the sector as a result of 
investments is 0.8%. However, when the efficiency variations following investment are 
weighted by their share of total investment in the sector; the effect increases to 17% 
reflecting the fact that more investment often resulted in higher efficiency. At the same time, 
there are significant variations in efficiency gain following investments at the level of 
individual companies. The results suggest those firms that fall short of no impact efficiency 
need to reduce their capital expenditure in order to improve their efficiency following 
investment. On the other hand, the firms that outperformed no impact efficiency may wish to 
increase their investment levels in order to gain from the efficiency they achieved. Overall, 
the new reallocation of investments increases the total investment of the sector without 
lowering the average efficiency gain of the sector.  
Efficiency is a relative concept in productivity analysis. Hence, using benchmarking tools to 
promote cost efficiency and at the same time to ensure efficient levels of investment can 
result in unintended outcomes. The Norwegian incentive regulation scheme is designed to 
discourage overinvestment through partial disallowance of capital expenditures built into the 
regulatory formula and benchmarking practice. However, the power of the model to detect 
overinvestments is limited to the case of ‘out of phase’ investments or non-harmonised 
investment behaviour.  
Moreover, benchmarking capital expenditures along with the other costs facilitates strategic 
behaviour by the firms in the form of trading-off between Capex and Opex in order to avoid 
financial loss in the process of revenue setting. Furthermore, systematic underinvestment can 
give the appearance of cost efficiency while it can have a negative effect on quality of service 
over time. Although underinvestment will eventually be reflected in the companies’ cost of 
energy not supplied and cost of network energy losses, it can take some time for this effect to 
become apparent while the cost and efficiency improvement effect of underinvestment is 
more immediate.  
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